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CASES NOTED
It is not entirely new to place a monetary value on the attention, love,
and devotion received by the child from its parents. When a railroad employee
dies as a result of injuries sustained in the course of employment, the damages
awarded to his children are based on the loss of the parent's company, care, and
guidance and not merely the detriment suffered due to the availability of only
a less adequate means of support.1 2 The Employer's Liability Act l provides
that compensation be granted to the child in such cases and it has been decided
that the infant's loss is of an altogether different nature than that suffered by
the remaining spouse.
14
Certainly, the denial of this right to children places the courts in a rather
incongruous position. Pecuniary compensation is awarded for the intangible
detriment resulting from the loss of a parent who is killed, but recovery is
denied when damage is due to other means.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE-HARGER DRUNKOMETER
Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide as a result of a death
attributable to his negligence in an automobile accident. The results of a drunk-
ometer test were admitted into evidence to support the state's contention that
he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. This evidence
obtained by the drunkometer was admitted over defendant's objection. Held,
on appeal, that data obtained through the "Harger Drunkometer" was improp-
erly admitted in evidence in support of the conclusion that defendant had been
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. Peopte v. Morse,
38 N.W.2d 322 (Mich. 1949).
Where evidence obtained by a scientific device is sought to be admitted,
the courts will usually permit the introduction of such evidence only if the
device by which said evidence is obtained is reliable.1 Until such proof, the
probative value attributable to evidence of this nature is subject to dispute.2
The courts appear to be overwhelmingly committed to the viewpoint that
chemical analysis of body fluids, together with expert opinion testimony as to
12. Norfolk v. Western R.R., 235 U.S. 625 (1915); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vree-
land, 227 U.S. 59 (1912) ; Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Cornett, 214 Ala. 23, 106
So. 242 (1925); Snipes v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 231 Mich. 404, 204 N.W. 84 (1925).
13. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. 51 (1946).
14. Mich. Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, supra.
1. State v. Thorp, 86 N.H. 501, 171 Att. 633 (1934) (ultraviolet ray machine);
McGrath v. Fash, 244 Mass. 327, 139 N.E. 303 (1923) (x-ray machine) ; 3 WMMORE,
EvIDNCE § 795 (3d ed. 1934).
2. State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936) (blood grouping to show
paternity). Photomicrographs of cut surfaces of knife, Compare State v. Fasick, 149
Wash. 92, 270 Pac. 123 (1928) (inadmissible), with State v. Clark, 156 Wash. 543, 287
Pac. 18 (1930) (admissible).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
what this analysis indicates regarding intoxication, are admissible, since such
tests have been proven scientifically accurate.3 On the other hand, the lie
detector, known as the systolic blood pressure deception test, has not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition among authorities as would
justify the admission of the results of such tests into evidence.
4
In the instant case the prosecution endeavored to bring evidence obtained
through use of the drunkometer within the scope of admissibility which it
claimed has been accorded to the various types of experiments pertaining to
the alcoholic content of body fluids. Defendant's contention was that the
drunkometer was analogous to the lie detector and thus lacked the credibility
necessary to be accepted in evidence. In support of the defendant's conten-
tion, five doctors testified against the device, one of which classified it as a
"slot machine."
As a device to determine the alcoholic content of the blood the reliability
of the drunkometer has been questioned both by medical and legal authorities.5
The main reason is that it has been difficult to eliminate the margin of error,
inherent in the machine itself. 6 Other reasons are that the physiological make-
up of the person tested is usually unknown, the presence of any foreign matter
in the suspect's mouth contaminates the machine, 7 and the evaporation of the
chemicals in the device depends upon local temperature conditions indicating
that different results would be reached in different parts of the country, s
It would appear that the drunkometer should not be given the probative
value conceded to the analysis of the blood because of the possibility of error.
It was inevitable that police officials and police courts should support mechani-
cal or chemical devices that purport to determine the sobriety of a suspect.
Appellate courts have been reluctant to permit considerations of administra-
tive convenience to infringe upon the rights of the accused.9 Such courts have
3. State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937); Kirschwing v. Farrar, 114
Colo. 421, 166 P.2d 154 (1946) ("We have been unable to find any case where the blood
test to determine intoxication has been excluded because of its unreliable value as proof.") ;
State v. Morkid, 286 N.W. 412 (1939). But cf. Kuroske v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,
234 Wis. 394, 291 N.W. 384 (1940).
4. Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (1923) ; People v. Becker, 399 Mich. 562,
2 N.W.2d 503 (1942) ; People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938) ; State v.
Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
5. Rabinowitch, Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication,
26 CAN. B. Rev. 1456 (1948); Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 KI. L.J.
266 (1946).
6. Haggard, Greenberg, Miller and Carroll, The Alcohol of the Lung Air as an Index
of Alcohol in the Blood, 26 JOURNAL OF LABORATORY AND CLINICAL MEDICINE 1527
(1941).
7, Newman, supra note 5.
8, Rabinowitch, supra note 5.
9. Spitler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N.E.2d 591 (1943); Guenther v. State, 221
S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1949); Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18 So.2d 752 (1944).
CASES NOTED
refused to accept conclusions in the name of "science" which would be rejected
if presented under any other authority. 0
FEDERAL TAXATION-STOCKHOLDERS' SALE
OF ASSETS OF LIQUIDATING CORPORATION
Plaintiff corporation's stockholders, at all times carrying on negotiations
for themselves and not the corporation, caused. the company to be dissolved and
the physical assets to be distributed to themselves as a liquidating dividend.
They thereupon sold the assets to another corporation, the entire procedure
being for the avowed purpose of avoiding double taxation. Plaintiff corpora-
tion brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover a tax deficiency assessment,
the tax having been paid and a claim for refund disallowed. Held, this was a
sale of assets by the stockholders as individuals and not a sale by the corpora-
tion. The corporation was therefore entitled to a refund. Cuinberland Public
Service Company v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 843 (1949).'
In recent years the courts have been confronted with an ever-recurring
problem as to whether or not the sale of assets by a liquidating corporation
through its stockholders is taxable both to the corporation and to the stock-
holders. This question generally arises where a corporation is owned by a small
number of stockholders 2 who are disposing of all or nearly all of the physical
assets of the company, and the current market value of the assets exceeds
10. The admissibility oi evidence obtained by use of the "Harger Drunkometer" is on
appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida. Because the defendants' submission to the
drunkometer had been voluntary, the matter of constitutional rights was not in issue.
This case points this out by showing that though a so-called test be taken voluntarily, its
results still are not admissible until the prosecution has carried the burden of showing that
it really is a "test," and a test of sufficient soundness to sustain expert testimony based
upon it. The court attempts to dispel the tendency to confuse the constitutional right against
self-incrimination with the totally irrelevant matter of the dependability of a given "test."
1. Cert. granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 88 (1949). But cf. Kaufmann v. Comm'r of Int. Rev.,
175 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1949) (This decision, one week prior to that of the instant case,
ruled that where negotiations were begun by a corporation before the commencement of
liquidation proceedings, the sale, though subsequently cast in the form of an agreement
with the stockholders, was actually made by the company).
Ia. After this Note was approved the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
instant case, United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 18 U.S.L. WEEK 4076
(U.S. Jan. 9, 1950), P-H 1950 FEn. TAX SEav. 72,006. Said Mr. Justice Black, 18
U.S.L. W.a at 4077, "While the distinction between sales by a corporation as com-
pared with distribution in kind followed by shareholder sales may be particularly shadowy
and artificial when the corporation is closely held, Congress has chosen to recognize
such a distinction for tax purposes."
2. E.g., Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (corporation had two
shareholders and its president was husband of the principal stockholder) ; Fairfield Steam-
ship Co. v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 321 (2nd Cir. 1946) (liquidating corporation 100% owned
by the corporation negotiating the sale) ; Cumberland Public Service Co. v. United States,
83 F. Supp. 843 (1949) (two men and their families owned all of the stock).
3. See Ayers, Stockholder or Cotporate Sale of Assets in Liquidation as Affected by
Court Holding Company and Howell Turpentine in N.Y.U. INsriTur" ON F.DERAL
TAXATION 364 (6th Annual ed. 1947).
